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A key precursor of twentieth-century financial crises in emerging and advanced economies alike was
the rapid buildup of leverage. Those emerging economies that avoided leverage booms during the
2000s also were most likely to avoid the worst effects of the twenty-first century's first global crisis.
A discrete-choice panel analysis using 1973-2010 data suggests that domestic credit expansion and
real currency appreciation have been the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises,
regardless of whether a country is emerging or advanced. For emerging economies, however, higher
foreign exchange reserves predict a sharply reduced probability of a subsequent crisis.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley







University of California, Berkeley




obstfeld@econ.berkeley.eduIn September 1976, Britain's Labour government announced that it would seek a rescue
loan from the International Monetary Fund. Italy, Portugal, and Spain also had stand-by
arrangements with the IMF around that time, and even the United States, facing a weakening
dollar, drew down its reserves at the IMF and exchanged Special Drawing Rights for foreign
currencies.1 But after Portugal's subsequent approach to the IMF in 1983, a quarter century
would pass before another high-income country sought the institution's support { a period
during which the Fund lent exclusively to crisis-stricken countries in the developing world.
Iceland's approach to the Fund in the autumn of 2008 was, however, soon followed by
sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal virulent enough to force them, too, to
seek ocial external support. At the time of writing (July 2011), the governments of other
high-income countries such as Spain and Italy face credible threats of losing access to credit.
Of course, these startling recent developments arose in part as collateral damage from the
much broader global nancial crisis that began in 2007 in the nancial markets of the United
States.
The nancial and economic collapse in advanced countries caught most academic, busi-
ness, and policy economists o guard. After the mid-1970s, an unstated consensus developed
that nancial crises were mainly emerging-market aairs. True, advanced countries such as
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Japan experienced systemic banking crises in the 1980s and
1990s. Around the same time, European countries also went through currency devaluation
crises, in some cases related to banking crises. While painful, these crises were less frequent
and generally less devastating than widespread cataclysms such as the 1980s developing-
country debt crisis or the 1997-98 Asian and Russian crises. Only countries in the lower
income groups, it was believed, would ever need any more to seek IMF support because of a
1See Boughton (2001, p. 138).
1sudden stop in external nance. Sovereign default by an advanced country was unthinkable.
Nothing of the sort had happened since the 1930s, when many developing countries likewise
defaulted, and the early post-World War II period (D az-Alejandro (1983)).
Buttressing the consensus view of emerging markets as much more vulnerable to nancial
crisis was a large catalog of mutually reinforcing structural weaknesses that researchers iden-
tied over the years. These range from limited nancial development, to faulty governance
structures, to over-regulated markets, to extensive dollarization of domestic and external
liabilities, to \fear of oating" the exchange rate. The mature advanced countries, it was
held, were much more robust in all of these areas, and therefore were in a position to derive
big net benets from liberalized and open nancial markets. But after the Asian crisis (if
not before), most economists accepted the need for emerging markets to tread cautiously.
In the light of this narrative, and in the light of late twentieth-century crisis experience,
the global crisis of 2007-2009 therefore produced another surprise. While some emerging
countries { notably several in the former Soviet bloc { suered greatly in the crisis, others
proved remarkably resilient, often experiencing smaller output declines and faster recoveries
than those in the advanced countries. Unlike in past global crises, emerging economies as
a group experienced an output decline similar to that of the advanced economies, rather
than greater; in general, their outputs fell from pre-crisis levels that were higher relative
to trends; and their outputs returned to trend more quickly than did the outputs of the
advanced economies.
Figure 1, which shows detrended real GDP growth rates for the advanced countries
and the six groups of emerging market economies (EMEs), illustrates these patterns.2 The
2Data come from the IMF's April 2011 World Economic Outlook (WEO); growth rates for 2011 are IMF
forecasts. For each country grouping, the growth rate of GDP is a weighted average of constant-price GDP
growth rates for individual countries, the country weights being shares of GDP (measured at purchasing
power parity) in group GDP (also measured at PPP). For the purpose of Figure 1 we dene a group's trend
2Commonwealth of Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe suered the harshest
growth declines, with the former losing 11.0 percent in 2009 and the latter 7.7 percent,
relative to trend. (We will discuss some reasons for these steep losses below.) Outside of
these regions, the advanced countries { primarily the United States, the European Union,
and Japan { suered most, with detrended growth rates of {2.3 percent in 2008, {5.9 percent
in 2009, and 0.2 percent in 2010. The gure also shows, however, that the Asia, Middle East-
North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa groups had relatively mild slowdowns in 2009 ({1.0,
{2.3 and {1.3 percent respectively). While EMEs in Latin America suered a 2009 growth
loss not too far below that of the advanced countries ({4.7 percent), this group fared much
better in both 2008 and 2010 (1.5 and 3.3 percent). And there is considerable heterogeneity
within the region. Brazil, for example, suered only a minor slowdown in 2009 ({0.6 percent),
while growing very strongly in both contiguous years (5.2 and 7.5 percent).
Figure 1 also shows that the decade of the 2000s until 2009 was a boom period for EMEs,
with growth generally far above the long-run trend. Supporting this exceptional growth were
low interest rates in the advanced economies and rising world commodity prices. Indeed, a
notable absence of major emerging-market crises for several years following the 2002 crises
in Argentina and Uruguay led some to speculate that the \Great Moderation" had funda-
mentally altered prospects for nancial stability in EMEs; and the IMF, which derives its
operating revenue from crisis lending, felt obliged both to downsize and to rethink its global
role. Historically, EME booms often have led to crashes, and while this pattern recurred
just east of the euro zone, the retrenchment elsewhere in the developing world was milder.
real growth rate as the average of annual growth rates over 1980-2011, except for the Russian federation and
Central and Eastern Europe, where we use the 1994-2011 average. (In the econometric analysis later in this
paper, we use a dierent method to detrend the level of real GDP, as is explained below.) The grouping of
countries is discussed in more details in section 2.2. A number of other studies have analyzed the relative
output performance of EMEs and advanced economies in the recent global crisis. For surveys, see Kose and
Prasad (2010) and Didier et al. (2011).
3Following the September 2008 Lehman Brothers failure, nancial ows to emerging markets
certainly contracted abruptly, world export demand collapsed temporarily, and many EME
currencies depreciated sharply. But most of the emerging world escaped systemic banking
crises and sovereign defaults. The outcome was very dierent from that of the 1980s debt
crisis, which also originated in a context of deep global recession.
In this paper we compare features of economic crises in advanced and developing economies.
The 2007-2009 crisis, with its seemingly divergent impacts on the advanced economies and
dierent groups of EMEs, can yield clues about the fundamental causes and consequences of
crises. We can hope to learn by comparing the characteristics of crises in dierent epochs, by
comparing across economies at distinct stages of development, and by distinguishing among
dierent types of crisis and dierent mechanisms of international transmission or contagion.
An important conclusion is that crises in emerging and advanced economies have their
origins in very similar underlying factors. Two seem especially important: a buildup of
domestic and external leverage in a context of explicit or implicit government guarantees
to a liberalized nancial sector, and real currency appreciation.3 Thus, the recent advanced
country experience, like that of some euro zone economies, has many hallmarks of earlier
\emerging market" crises in Latin America and Asia. An economy's structural features
determine the likelihood that one or more causal factors triggers a crisis, as well as the
severity of its eects; but these are dierences of degree, not of kind. At least over the
rst decade of the twenty-rst century, structural evolution appears to have raised the crisis
sensitivity of advanced economies relative to that of many emerging economies, making the
3The role of credit booms is familiar from studies such as D az-Alejandro (1985), McKinnon and Pill
(1996), Sachs et al. (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Corsetti et al. (1999), Dooley (2000), Gourinchas
et al. (2001), Tornell (2001), Glick and Hutchison (2001), Hernandez and Landerretche (2002), Mendoza and
Terrones (2008), Schularick and Taylor (2009), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2011). Among macroeconomists,
however, real appreciation as a prologue to crises received much more attention than credit-market factors
until the latter 1990s. Dornbusch et al. (1995), among a host of others, stress the role of real appreciations.
4latest global crisis work out quite dierently so far from twentieth-century crises for many
EMEs. We add the qualier \so far" because, as we shall see below, current EME nancial
inows and credit expansion, fueled by both the EMEs' relative economic strength and
continuing expansive monetary policies in richer countries, may signal nancial problems
down the road.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section I we distinguish among alternative varieties
of nancial crisis and discuss the structural weaknesses of EMEs that have tended over the
past to make them especially susceptible to crises. We document the frequency of dierent
types of crisis in advanced economies and EMEs. Section II analyzes key economic data from
advanced economies and EMEs around dierent types of crisis. Our goal is to compare salient
features of similar crises in advanced and emerging economies, as well as dierences between
past crises (from 1973 to 2006) and the 2007-2009 crisis. We employ two complementary
methodologies to explore the data: event studies of how key economic variables behave
around dierent categories of crisis, as well as logit analyses of crisis probabilities. In the
light of that evidence and a developing body of empirical research, Section III advances
hypotheses about why less-developed countries on the whole did not fare worse than advanced
economies in the current crisis, and why the impact diered so markedly across dierent
emerging regions. Section IV concludes.
1 Crisis Types and Emerging Market Vulnerabilities
Economists have studied many types of nancial crisis, but our analysis is restricted to three
that tend to be closely interrelated in practice: currency crises (in which a managed exchange
rate falls to speculative pressure), banking crises (including instability in the shadow banking
5system), government default crises (involving default or market fears of explicit default on
internal or external public debt). Banking crises can involve a limited range of institutions,
so that their collateral impact on the core of the nancial system is contained, as in the
United States Savings and Loan crisis. We focus instead on systemic banking crises, which
endanger the entire economy (and possibly, through various channels of contagion, foreign
economies).
The links between \twin" banking and currency crises are well known. As documented
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), banking crises tend to begin ahead of currency crises
when the two occur together, with ight from the nancial system and government liquidity
support for banks soon leading to ight from the currency and thus, massive depreciation.
Currency depreciation fears exacerbate (and may themselves cause) banking problems as
domestic-currency depositors switch into foreign exchange perhaps due to higher interest
rates as authorities try (usually in vain) to defend the currency. If banks or bank borrowers
have unhedged debts denominated in foreign currency, currency depreciation inates the real
value of bank liabilities or, by rendering bank borrowers insolvent, reduces bank assets.
A systemic banking crisis, especially if exacerbated by currency depreciation, can jeop-
ardize the public nances as the government intervenes to guarantee bank liabilities, acquire
impaired bank assets, or inject capital. If suciently expensive, these bailout measures may
add a third sibling { a sovereign default crisis { to the twins. Of course, a default crisis may
originate in simple scal proigacy rather than a private-sector nancial collapse, although
currency and banking problems are likely to follow. Default on public debt must be explicit
if government bonds are indexed or foreign-currency denominated, but for debts in domestic
currency, default may (but need not) take the form of surprise ination.4 In this paper we
4See Reinhart and Rogo (2009, partIII).
6consider only explicit default episodes.
Data from the 1970s through 2007 (covering the impact as well as the frequency of
events) suggest that emerging markets were particularly susceptible to currency, banking,
and sovereign default crises prior to the recent global crisis. A large empirical literature seeks
to document the timing of nancial crises, and while alternative criteria can yield somewhat
dierent conclusions (especially with regard to timing), the broad empirical regularities con-
cerning crisis incidence are fairly uncontroversial. We draw our dating of systemic banking
crises and sovereign default crises from Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Caprio et al. (2003),
Laeven and Valencia (2010), Cantor and Packer (1995), Chambers (2011), Moody's (2009),
and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007). To date EME currency crises we use the criterion
of Frankel and Rose (1996) { a 25 percent or greater nominal currency depreciation over a year
that is also a 10 percentage point increase in the annual rate of depreciation. For advanced
economies we use the chronology of Bordo et al. (2001), which extends through 1997. After
1997 there were no true currency crises in advanced countries until 2008, notwithstanding
the ersatz crises some authors have identied using mechanical criteria.
Table 1 shows that in the past, crises in general have been much more prevalent in EMEs.
All of the 74 (external and internal) sovereign default episodes occurred in EMEs, although
several peripheral euro zone are now on the brink of joining the list. Fifty seven of the 62
pre-2007 systemic banking crises took place in EMEs, and EMEs had about twice as many
currency crises, often-times not in conjunction with banking crises.5
Several characteristics of EMEs dierentiate them from advanced economies and made
them especially crisis-prone in the past. Countries naturally dier among each other, making
5The ve systemic advanced-country banking crises occurred in Spain, Japan, Norway, Finland, and
Sweden. Notice that while the number of currency crises per country is not especially low for advanced
economies, our criterion for an advanced-country currency crisis, described earlier, is more lenient than for
EMEs.
7generalizations imperfect, but a majority of the features we describe below have applied to
most EMEs. In turn, these distinctive features mostly stem from a deeper source: a level of
institutional quality generally lower than that in advanced economies.
Economists believe that the ecacy of a country's governance institutions is central to un-
derstanding its income per capita, as well as other key features of its economic performance.
While quantitative measures of institutional quality are necessarily crude, they uniformly
point to lower average quality in the emerging world compared with mature economies.6 In
turn, these shortcomings in governance are closely linked to most of the items on economists'
standard list of emerging-market weaknesses, which emerged out of twentieth-century expe-
rience:
 Political and economic instability. Political instability breeds economic instability,
as illustrated by the relatively more variable EME growth rates through 2007 shown
in Figure 1 (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2003)). Macro policies tend to be
procyclical (Kaminsky et al. (2005)) due to conicts over windfalls in good times and
the absence of predictable and widely accepted mechanisms to allocate losses in bad.
Ination is a favored method of resolving distributional disputes that the political
process cannot settle (Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005)). Diculty in levying and collecting
taxes worsens the scal position overall, contributing both to procyclicality and the
reliance on ination. Volatility may be heightened by undiversied export mixes, for
example, reliance on a few main commodity exports.
6Naturally there are exceptions. For example, Chile in 2010 surpassed the United States on Transparency
International's inverse index of corruption (and in the same year entered the OECD). Nonetheless, there is
a strong positive correlation between the Transparency International index and real per capita GDP. The
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators project measures institutional quality along six dimensions:
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government eectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. All of these measures correlate positively with per capita
income. Of course, there is a two-way causality, since institutional imperfections impede wealth accumulation
but likewise are more likely when resources for investment in institutional quality are low.
8 Undeveloped and unstable nancial markets. Unreliable contract enforcement dictates
a reliance on relatively simple, information-insensitive, noncontingent nancial con-
tracts. Imperfect protection of equity investors fosters ownership concentration and
limits gains from risk sharing, domestic and international (Stulz (2005)). At the same
time, government restrictions may discourage competition and innovation in nancial
markets, allowing connected lending and other forms of cronyism to ourish. A lack
of nancial depth limits the economy's ability to absorb economic shocks. While bu-
reaucratic restrictions abound, eective enforcement of prudential standards often lags
because of opaque accounting practices, corruption, and a lack of expertise. Weak
political institutions limit the checks and balances needed to minimize abuses. As
D az-Alejandro (1985, p. 20) observes in his classic analysis of Latin American nan-
cial instability, \[D]emocracy, whatever its more fundamental virtues, is an important
technical input for a healthy domestic nancial system." An expectation that gov-
ernment will bail out failing nancial institutions, validated by experience in Latin
America, Asia, and elsewhere, creates moral hazard. This spells trouble when nan-
cial transactions are liberalized (externally or domestically) without adequate prior
safeguards (see, for example, Demirg u c-Kunt and Detragiache (2000); Honohan and
Klingebiel (2003)).
 Dollarization, original sin, and currency mismatches. Frequent recourse to inationary
nance in the past has created a tendency for nancial contracts to be denominated
in a stable foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar or euro (Eichengreen et al. (2007);
Goldstein and Turner (2004); Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005)). This tendency applies both
to internal contracts and external loan agreements; in the latter context, the inability to
borrow from foreigners in domestic currency is conventionally referred to as \original
9sin." Domestic liability dollarization has an important advantage for creditors over
alternative form of real principal protection, such as price-level indexation: it does not
depend on government discretion with respect to ination measurement or the timing
of ination adjustment. Unfortunately, dollarization of liabilities is likely to entail a
short position in dollars for the home banking system, either explicitly or implicitly,
because even bank loans to domestic customers that are denominated in dollars on
paper are likely to go bust when a sudden currency depreciation raises the real value of
the loan. For a sample of about a hundred developing economies, Nicol o et al. (2005)
document the links between macro instability and dollarization of bank deposits and
between dollarization and nancial instability. At the national level, original sin implies
that currency depreciation will raise the real value of external debt. Through these
mechanisms, as we have noted, sharp currency depreciations can lead to nancial crises.
 Fear of oating. Even where emerging markets have not literally pegged their cur-
rencies' foreign exchange values, they have shown less willingness to tolerate sharp
nominal exchange rate movements than the advanced countries (Calvo and Reinhart
(2002); Hausmann et al. (2001)). Fear of sharp appreciation and its negative eect on
exports is evidenced in the recent controversy over \currency wars." Particularly when
an EME is nancially open and faces nancial inows, as has been the case for many
in recent years, intervention to resist currency appreciation, coupled with incomplete
sterilization of reserve inows, may undermine domestic ination targets, bid up asset
prices, and push domestic credit expansion to dangerous levels. EMEs also have feared
sharp currency depreciation, as depreciation can cause debt deation (in the presence
of currency mismatch) and a jump in ination. Indeed, once the domestic currency
begins to depreciate, dollar debtors may scramble for that currency in order to un-
10wind short positions, leading to further depreciation and heightened nancial distress.
Some argue that the government's reluctance to allow sharp exchange rate movements
in the past has itself contributed to currency mismatch { there may be an expectation
that ocial intervention to support the exchange rate will allow dollar debtors to close
out their short positions at public expense (Mishkin (1998); Burnside et al. (2001);
Schneider and Tornell (2004)).7
 Sudden stops and debt intolerance. EMEs have been vulnerable to sudden stops in
foreign lending, which may require not only a sharp reduction in the current account
decit also but abrupt demands for repayment of short-term external debt (Calvo
and Reinhart (2000); Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000); Edwards (2004); Forbes and
Warnock (2011)). Unless the country can draw on ocial foreign exchange reserves or
relatively liquid gross assets held abroad by the private sector, such events typically
will be associated with abrupt currency depreciation and the associated nancial reper-
cussions. Financial fragility and the government's weakness in generating resources for
debt repayment are conducive to volatility in capital ows. At the same time, credit
rationing may occur at external debt levels far below those that advanced countries
seem able to sustain { a phenomenon that has been labeled \debt intolerance" by
Reinhart et al. (2003).
 Over regulation of nonnancial markets. Heavy regulation in product and labor mar-
kets reduces exibility in resource reallocation following economic shocks. In particular,
structural rigidities help explain the fear of oating, because unexpected exchange rate
movements have magnied eects on sectoral imbalances and intersectoral adjustment
7For the argument that xed exchange rates are not a primary cause of currency mismatch, see Honig
(2009).
11costs. Thickets of administrative barriers to economic activity, such as licensing re-
quirements, promote corruption as well as ineciency.
In view of this array of structural defects, it is all the more impressive that emerging
markets did not suer even more in the recent global crisis. As we discuss below, many
observers believe that some EMEs have made progress repairing or at least compensating
for these weaknesses. On the other hand, recent events make mature economies appear
suddenly vulnerable to some aspects of these \emerging-market" weaknesses. Advanced
countries still score generally well in terms of political and economic stability, ability to use
the exchange rate as a shock absorber, and exibility in nonnancial markets.8 But their
nancial markets have caused problems.9
Consider nancial development. This area of relative advanced country \strength" ar-
guably exacerbated the eects of the crisis in the rich economies. Table 2 shows ratios of
total commercial bank assets relative to GDP in 2003 and 2007 for a range of countries.
(Total banking system assets are greater.) As is apparent, emerging markets, in general,
have smaller banking systems than the mature economies.10 Furthermore, there is a remark-
able divergence in the growth of banking assets between 2003 and 2007. EU bank assets
increased by a staggering 97.6 percent of EU GDP , whereas EME bank assets grew by far
less { emerging Europe showing the biggest increase. The growth of United States bank-
8Of course there are exceptions, for example, the structural labor-market rigidities leading to high unem-
ployment in some advanced countries.
9Arguably the widespread resistance to recognizing advanced-country nancial weaknesses until now
represents past escapes from disaster, as well as an important element of denial. Reviewing the U.S. nancial
market turmoil of late 1998, for example, Lamfalussy (2000) (p. 140f) wrote, \If such developments can take
place in the model market of the world, what is the practical value of recommending that emerging markets
copy this model?"
10United States banking assets appear moderate in relation to GDP due to the importance of the shadow
banking sector, which is much less developed in other high-income countries. The Asia aggregate in Table 2
includes the (now) high-income \newly industrialized Asia" group consisting of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan. These countries generally have banking systems more extensive than those in poorer emerging
Asian countries.
12ing assets that the table reports seems moderate, but omits a substantial contribution from
o-balance-sheet vehicles.
In EU and other rich countries, lax prudential oversight in the face of the rapid nancial-
market expansion of the 2000s has increased the level of nancial risk. In marked contrast to
the pre-2007 experience summarized in Table 1, ten advanced countries had systemic banking
crises in 2007-2009 and a further six had milder (but still costly) \borderline" systemic crises
(according to the classications of Laeven and Valencia (2010)). Only two EMEs (Latvia and
Ukraine) had systemic banking crises in those years, while four more (Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Slovenia) had borderline systemic crises.11
Experience in emerging and advanced economies alike shows that no government will
allow a domestic nancial system collapse if it can marshal the resources to prevent it.
Apparently, moral hazard does not discriminate across income levels. The sizes of some
advanced country bank balance sheets, however, make obvious the dangers to the rich coun-
tries' public nances of broad banking system guarantees Other things equal, scal support
of the banking system in times of stress may be more feasible for the government budget
of an EME, whereas for some advanced economies even a year's GDP might not suce to
handle a severe systemic crisis. While all the industrial countries currently face aggravated
scal adjustment challenges as a result of past interventions to support their nancial sectors,
countries with banking-system balance sheets that are multiples of GDP are especially at
risk for the future. Sovereign defaults (which themselves are likely to have adverse political
consequences) are no longer unthinkable for rich countries. The events leading to Ireland's
recent sovereign debt problems are a case in point.12
11In 2008, Mongolia, which we consider to be a non-emerging developing country, also had a systemic
banking crisis according to Laeven and Valencia (2010). Their list does not include some more limited
events, such as Nigeria's 2009 banking stress.
12Even leaving aside their partial coverage of the banking system, the numbers in Table 2 may not ac-
13High levels of intermediation in mature nancial markets have likewise given rise to
substantial currency mismatches. Extensive European bank investments in U.S. subprime-
related securities, nanced by short-term wholesale dollar borrowing, led to dollar shortages
in 2007-2009 when dollar funding markets froze. The dollar appreciated sharply. Federal
Reserve swap lines, rst extended in December 2007 and renewed several times since then,
were particularly helpful for European banks seeking to avoid distress sales of dollar assets
(although the swaps were made available to a small group of EMEs as well). The Euro-
pean banks' plight demonstrates how, even in an advanced country crisis, maturity or other
mismatches between foreign currency assets and liabilities can rapidly morph into currency
mismatch.
Finally, advanced economies also saw sudden stops in the aftermath of the Lehman
collapse. United States balance of payments data, for example, show that from 2008:IV
through 2009:II, foreign lenders ceased lending to the U.S. and indeed, liquidated nearly
$165 billion in U.S. assets. Unlike emerging markets, however, U.S. residents hold a stock
of gross foreign assets that is higher than GDP. As a result, they were able to meet foreign
repayment demands, at the same time nancing a continuing current account decit, by
selling o their own assets located abroad. Since the sell-o included claims on emerging
markets, it is all the more striking that a majority of EMEs did not suer nancial collapse
in the crisis.
We summarize as follows. Crises of several types have been frequent since 1970 (and
of course were common in earlier epochs). Because of several structural weaknesses in the
polities and economies of emerging markets, crises have been much more common there.
curately represent the potential claim on public sector resources arising from bank rescues. Some of the
assets measured in these numbers are held by banks with primarily foreign operations, and little connection
on either the asset or liability side to the domestic economy. On the other hand, a government could face
pressures to rescue a domestically-owned bank with primarily foreign operations.
14However, some features of advanced economies that sometimes are viewed as strengths {
notably nancial depth { pose threats as well, given limited prudential oversight, bailout
expectations, and other market incentives for socially excessive risk taking. At the same time,
some EMEs have labored over the early twenty-rst century to reduce their vulnerabilities,
and these eorts may have borne fruit in the recent crisis. We next turn to the data to
compare EME and advanced country performance.
2 Some Empirics of Crises: Emerging and Advanced
Economies, Then and Now
Two types of comparison, across country types and across time, interest us. These are
motivated by two questions: How have crises diered, in their precursors and aftermaths,
between emerging and advanced economies? And in both sets of countries, how does the
crisis of 2007-2009 dier from earlier crises? Ultimately, we hope the data will help us
to understand the dierent experiences of advanced and emerging economies, as well as
of dierent regional groupings of emerging economies, in the recent crisis. The structural
features of EMEs listed in the last section change slowly over time and thus are not easily
amenable to time series analysis. However, our comparisons across country groups and time
periods are intended to capture broad structural dierences.
In the spirit of Eichengreen et al. (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and several sub-
sequent authors, we examine the behavior of key economic variables around crisis episodes.
We focus on variables which, according to theory and earlier empirical research, are likely
to play a causal role in determining the probability of a crisis, are likely to be aected by a
crisis, or both. While Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) average their data over cross sections
15consisting of country-crisis pairs, relying on dierent cross sections for information on dif-
ferent crisis types, we take an alternative approach. Instead, we estimate directly how an
economic variable's conditional expectation depends on temporal distance from each of three
types of crisis { default (internal or external), banking, and currency { given the proximity
of other crisis types.
More specically, we examine the behavior of output, domestic credit, the current ac-
count balance, external leverage, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, international
reserves, and scal variables. The relevance of most of these variables will be obvious. For
example, a rapid buildup of domestic credit can undermine a currency peg as the central
bank loses foreign exchange reserves, while simultaneously setting the stage for a private
banking collapse and a setback to government solvency. Likewise, signicant real currency
appreciation has often preceded nancial crises.
We then tackle the obvious question: to what extent are the same macroeconomic and
nancial variables useful in predicting the onset of crises? Do emerging markets collapse every
time credit growth is high? Do the currencies of advanced economies' crash systematically in
the aftermath of a signicant real appreciation? We answer this question by using discrete-
choice models to estimate the probability of a given type of crisis as a function of the same
set of variables.
2.1 Methodology
Consider a variable of interest yit, where subscript i refers to the country and subscript t
to the period. Our approach is to estimate the conditional expectation of yit as a function
of the temporal distance from various types of crisis, relative to a common \tranquil times"
baseline. As discussed in the previous section, our benchmark estimation considers four
16possible crisis types: domestic and external default, systemic banking crisis, currency crisis,
and the global nancial crisis of 2008.13
We postulate the following xed-eects panel specication:
yit = i + dsds + bsbs + cscs + gsgs + it: (1)
In equation (1), js denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 when country i is s periods away
from a crisis of type j in period t:The index j denotes, respectively, default (d), systemic
banking crisis (b), currency crisis (c) and the 2008 global nancial crisis (g). We set the
event window around crisis episodes to 11 years (ve years before, ve years after) so as to
allow the relatively slow adjustment that typically follows a nancial crisis (Reinhart and
Rogo (2009); Reinhart and Reinhart (2011)). The regression also allows for country xed
eects i: Finally, the error term it captures all the remaining variation in the realization
of the variable of interest.
A number of observations about our empirical specication are relevant at this stage.
First, the coecients js are our primary parameters of interest. They measure the condi-
tional eect of a crisis of type j on variable y over the event window  5  s  5 relative
to \tranquil times."14 Since the \tranquil time" baseline is common to all types of crisis,
we are measuring the impact of dierent crises relative to a common reference level. This
is important because it will allows us to measure directly and compare how dierent macro
and nancial variables evolve over dierent crisis episodes. In particular, comparison of gs
13As noted earlier, we date domestic and external defaults following Reinhart and Rogo (2009); systemic
banking crises according to Laeven and Valencia (2010); EME currency crises following the criteria set out
in Frankel and Rose (1996); and advanced countries currency crisis according to the Bordo et al. (2001)
classication. We assume that all countries were potentially aected by the global nancial crisis, which we
view as starting in 2008, when it rst became truly systemic.
14Tranquil times are implicitly dened as the country-year observations that do not fall into any crisis-event
window.
17and js for j 6= g; provides us with a direct assessment of the similarities between the recent
global nancial crisis and earlier crises of various kinds.
Second, because we consider that all countries are \treated" by the recent global nancial
crisis, the coecients gs have the interpretation of year-eects for the period 2003-2010.
Hence, gs measures the deviation of the cross section average in the corresponding years
from the \tranquil time" baseline, itself estimated over the period 1973-2002 and purged
of crisis episodes. Unlike simple deviations from trend (which potentially include earlier
crisis episodes), we therefore construct a potentially cleaner estimate of the build-up and
subsequent impact of the global nancial crisis.15
Third, our specication easily handles repeat or multiple crises, of the same type or of
dierent types, with one important caveat. For instance, the estimated conditional mean
for a country one year away from a currency crisis and one year after a banking crisis is
simply ^  1c + ^ 1b: There is no need to decide whether recurrent episodes are really part of a
single larger crisis, or to extend event-windows to encompass dierent crisis manifestations.
The caveat, as the formula above illustrates clearly, is that our specication does not allow
for interaction eects. In other words, it does not allow for the amplication and feedback
eects between dierent types of crisis or repeated crises. The eect of a twin banking
and currency crisis, in the simplied setting we assume, is simply the sum of the eect
of an isolated banking crisis, ^ b, and an isolated currency crisis, ^ c. This simplication
has potentially important drawbacks, as our earlier discussion of potential two-way feedback
loops between currency and banking crises shows.16 Potential linkages also exist also between
banking crisis and domestic or sovereign defaults episodes.
15Obviously, our approach still requires that we control for non-stationarities in the data; otherwise the
\tranquil time" benchmark would not be appropriate.
16There are numerous discussions in the literature, including Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Obstfeld
(2004), Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005), and references therein.
18These concerns can be addressed by estimating a variation of equation (1) that includes
interaction eects:






jksjks + it: (2)
In equation (2) jks is a dummy equal to one when country i is s periods away from joint
crisis of type j and k in period t.17 The corresponding coecients jks have a particularly
simple interpretation in the case where jk = jk; that is, when jk is simply the interaction
of the crisis dummies of type j and k: In that case, jks represents the dierence-in-dierence
estimator of the eect of a joint crisis, over and above the eect of an isolated crisis. In theory,
this specication allows us to test directly for interaction eects of the kind described in the
literature.18 In practice, including all types of crisis and all possible interactions quickly
makes all coecients statistically insignicant. Given the focus in the literature on twin
banking and currency crises, we implemented a version of equation (2) involving banking
and currency crisis episodes only (along with their interaction).19 Nevertheless, we found
that estimates of the interaction terms cbs; while sometimes large in magnitude, were most
often statistically insignicant. This nding suggests that, while banking and currency crises
can potentially interact in major ways, the eects do not appear systematic. In what follows,
we therefore omit interaction terms.
17In practice, we allow for the fact that joint crises have some dynamic features and need not necessarily
happen in exactly the same year. We set jk0 equal to 1 if a crisis of type j or k occurs in year t, a crisis of
type j or k occurs in year t + 1; but there is no crisis of type j or k in year t   1:
18By contrast, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do not estimate the treatment eect of a joint crisis, relative
to an isolated crisis. They report estimates of the eect of a joint crisis, that is, c+b+cb, and unconditional
estimates of the eect of a crisis of type j: For example, for a currency crisis, the unconditional eect they
estimate corresponds to the c + bE [bjc = 1] + cbE [cbjc = 1].
19Indeed, twin banking-currency crises are quite prevalent in our sample. Of the ve systemic banking
crises for advanced economies, three are twin banking-currency crises { Spain (1977), Finland (1991), and
Sweden (1991) { whereas the remaining two { Norway (1991) and Japan (1997) { are isolated banking crises.
Of the 42 banking crises in EMEs, 36 are twinned with currency crises according to our classication.
19Finally, we implement equation (1) separately on advanced and emerging market economies.
As the discussion of the preceding section made clear, allowing for dierent crisis dynamics
for the two groups of countries will allow us to answer two important questions: How have
the crises of EMEs and advanced economies diered in the past (that is, is ^ eme
js dierent
from ^ adv
js )? And how does the current crisis dier from earlier crises (that is, is ^ adv
gs or eme
gs
similar to ^ adv
js or ^ eme
js )?
2.2 What Happens Before, During and After Crises?
We now systematically evaluate the relative behavior of various macroeconomic and nancial
variables around crises events by estimating equation (1). We consider 11 variables, covering
various aspects of the domestic, external, real, and nancial environment.20
Our sample of emerging market economies comprises all countries for which data are
available that are included in either J.P.Morgan's EMBIG index, the FTSE's Group of
Advanced or Secondary Emerging markets, the MSCI-Barra classication of Emerging or
Frontier economies, and the Dow-Jones list of Emerging Markets Economies. These outlets
determine lists of emerging market economies based on indicators of economic development
and nancial market infrastructure. To these countries, we add Israel, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore, all countries that recently graduated to the group of advanced economies but properly
belong to the group of emerging market economies for most of our sample period. Because
our discussion stresses international nancial linkages and nancial vulnerabilities, we also
exclude from consideration lower-income developing countries with relatively undeveloped
nancial sectors and relatively limited nancial openness.21 Our nal list contains 57 emerg-
20All data sources are described in appendix B.
21For these reasons, our group of EMEs diers from that used by the IMF's World Economic Outlook.:
20ing market economies distributed among six regional groupings.22 In addition, we compile
data for 22 advanced economies.23
We begin with a measure of real activity, the output gap, constructed as the deviation of
the log of real output from a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend.24 The results from the estimation
of equation (1) are presented in the top panel of gure 2. Because we will make repeated use
of that gure, let us spend a moment describing the information it contains. The top row,
labeled \EM," reports the estimates for our sample of 57 emerging market economies. The
bottom row, labeled \ADV," reports the coecients of advanced economies. Each column
(labeled, respectively \Default," \Banking," \Currency," and \2008") refers to a dierent
type of crisis, with the rst three columns referring to pre-2007 crises only. Finally, in each
panel the solid line reports the coecients ^ js over the event window, together with a 95
percent condence interval.25 The beginning of a crisis (s = 0 in event time) is indicated by
22The list of EMEs is as follows. Middle East and North Africa (10 countries): Egypt, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates. Latin America (13 countries):
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Asia (11 countries): China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand. Sub-saharan Africa (3 countries): C^ ote d'Ivoire,
Nigeria, South Africa. Commonwealth of Independent States (5 countries): Belarus, Georgia, Kaza-
khstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine. Central and Eastern European (15 countries): Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Turkey.
23The list of advanced economies is follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
24We set the smoothing coecient of the HP lter at 100. With annual data, this lters out more than
30% of cycles of periodicity higher than 16 years (64 quarters) { see King and Rebelo (1993, p. 220). Typical
U.S. business cycle applications usually set the smoothing parameter at 1600 (on quarterly data) or 6.25 on
annual data { see Ravn and Uhlig (2002). This lters out more than 30% of cycles of periodicity higher than
32 quarters. Because boom-crisis-bust dynamics often occur on a timescale slower than U.S. business cycles,
we view our focus on lower frequencies as sensible. Our results are robust to reasonable variation in the
smoothing coecient, as long as our estimate of the output gap includes medium-run frequencies, including
linear detrending at one extreme.
25That is, we graph approximately two standard deviations on each side of the estimated coecients,
unlike Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who graph only one standard deviation on each side. Our estimates
are based on robust (White) standard errors. Similar results (but with somewhat larger standard errors) are
obtained when clustering EMEs by region. Given the global propagation of trade and especially nancial
21a vertical dashed line.
Figure 2(a) presents patterns relating to real GDP. The rst three columns for EMEs
show that output tends to be signicantly above trend (a positive output gap) in the years
preceding default and banking crises, relative to tranquil times.26 This is true for advanced
countries as well (bottom row), though, given the small number of banking crises, the es-
timated deviations are less signicant. By contrast, in the run up to a currency crisis, the
output gap is negative { slightly for advanced economies but more so for EMEs. The pat-
terns are consistent with the view that banking crises are often preceded by exuberant and
unsustainable levels of economic activity, fueled by cheap credit. The contrasting morose
environment that precedes currency crises often reects in part the contractionary eorts
imposed by a central bank trying to defend a currency peg under attack. Currency crises
can occur precisely when economic conditions take a turn for the worse and investors lose
condence in the willingness of authorities to defend the peg, or following a period of above
average domestic ination that appreciates the currency and worsens external balances, de-
pressing aggregate activity.
All crises are associated with a signicant decline in the output gap relative to tranquil
times. Output falls relatively less in advanced countries and recovers faster than for EMEs
in the aftermath of a currency crisis, perhaps because of negative wealth eects in EMEs of
the type highlighted in the literature on contractionary devaluation.
A quantitative comparison between advanced and EME banking crises reveals several
dierences. Both groups of countries experience abnormally high economic activity before
a banking crisis, around 2 percent above potential for advanced countries and 4.6 percent
for EMEs. But the decline in output is larger for the latter group (8.5 percent from peak
shocks, however, the theoretical basis for regional clustering seems weak.
26However, output growth seems to slow before both types of crisis.
22to trough) as compared to advanced economies (5.2 percent). Levels of economic activity
also remain depressed for a signicant period following an advanced country banking crisis,
a nding similar to those of Reinhart and Rogo (2009) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2011).
Indeed, our point estimates suggest that the recovery from banking crises is slower for ad-
vanced countries. Five years after the beginning of the systemic phase of the banking crisis
(which may itself have been preceded by an extended period of nancial distress), output
remains signicantly depressed for these countries (1.6 percent below potential). By con-
trast, emerging markets appear somewhat more resilient faced with banking crises, and their
output recovers within ve years.27 This last result may be a consequence of the higher level
of development and sophistication of advanced economies' banking and nancial sectors. As
the example of Japan illustrates, an economy with a complex nancial system may take
much more than ve years to recover once that system is impaired. Our ndings do not
contradict the view that past nancial crises were on the whole relatively more costly for
EMEs, because EME banking crises often coincided with currency crises, default crises, or
both.
Finally, a comparison of previous crises and the recent global crisis reveals a number of
facts. First, the run up to the 2008 crisis, like earlier nancial crises, was characterized by
above-trend economic activity. The positive output gap is especially salient for emerging
countries (reaching a peak of 3.8 percent in 2008), but also for advanced economies (3.3
percent in 2007). From that point on, two ndings are worth noting. First, the post-crisis
absolute deviation of output from trend has been somewhat smaller in emerging than in ad-
vanced economies (2.6 percent versus 3.6 percent). This conrms the evidence presented in
gure 1: on the whole, emerging markets displayed resilience compared to their performance
27A formal statistical test, however, would likely not reject the hypothesis that the post-crisis output paths
for the two groups are the same.
23in past crises. Second, the overall slowdown in advanced economies is even larger than those
experienced during earlier major banking crises. Based on the severity of the output slow-
down, the recent experience of advanced economies resembles most that of earlier systemic
banking crisis episodes, except on a larger and broader scale.
The bottom panel of gure 2 reports our ndings for consumer price ination.28 Ination
was an endemic issue for many emerging economies in the last part of the twentieth century.
It appears elevated, relative to tranquil times, before all types of crisis. It increases signif-
icantly afterward as any constraint on looser monetary policy disappears after a currency
crisis, or as the temptation to inate nominal claims away proves irresistible. In the year
following a currency or a banking crisis, ination rates are 10 to 15 percent above normal
times. For advanced economies, in contrast, ination remained subdued, especially around
banking crises. The contrast with the recent crisis is striking: Consumer price ination in
emerging economies, although increasing between 2003 and 2008 as a result of the rapid
increase in food and commodity prices, has remained signicantly below the tranquil-rime
average after 2008.
Next we investigate the public nances. The top panel of gure 3 reports our estimates
for the dynamics of gross public debt (as a fraction of GDP) around crises.29 While many es-
timates are statistically insignicant or borderline, the overall patterns presents some notable
features for emerging and advanced economies alike. First, the scal position is estimated
to worsen substantially in the aftermath of any crisis, for both country groups. The ratio of
public debt to GDP increases most dramatically for advanced country banking crises (27.2
28Because some countries in our sample experienced high or even hyper inations, we estimate equation
(1) using median regression. Notably, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia all experienced annual ination rates in excess of of 1,000 percent at some
point in our sample. The standard errors on the median regression were constructed by bootstrap.
29Data on public debt refer to either central or general government debt, as collated by Reinhart and
Rogo (2009). See appendix B for details.
24percent of GDP between t 1 and t+5), with the next most dramatic eect being after EME
currency crises (9.2 percent of GDP). A number of channels are probably responsible for the
advanced country deterioration. First, government bailouts of insolvent domestic nancial
sectors constitute direct scal costs. Second, as the economy slows down markedly in the
aftermath of crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP tends to increase both for mechanical
reasons { the denominator in the ratio decreases { but also because of rapidly growing public
decits, themselves the result of additional outlays and lost revenues.30 In the case of EME
currency crises, devaluation or depreciation raises the home-currency value of public debt
denominated in foreign currency, worsening the scal position through an adverse valuation
eect. There is little evidence, however, that measured public debts are especially high prior
to pre-2008 crises.
Consider now the 2008 crisis. While emerging countries started the 2000s with relatively
high public debt levels, the period from 2003 to 2008 was one of rapid scal consolidation,
with an improvement in the ratio of public debt to GDP representing 11.2 percent of output
between 2003 and 2008. On average, emerging economies approached the crisis in a position
of unprecedented scal strength, allowing them to apply countercyclical scal stimulus when
needed much more freely than in the past. The scal health of the advanced economies,
however, was signicantly stretched even before the crisis, with a public debt in excess of
baseline values by about 10 percent of GDP. The subsequent deterioration in scal position,
by an additional double-digit percentage of GDP (14.2 percent between 2008 and 2010), is
threatening the sustainability of a number of industrial countries' public debts. Examining
public decits rather than debts (not reported), we nd a similar pattern.
The bottom part of gure 3 reports our estimates for the real interest rate, measured
30Our estimates indicate that for advanced economies, the public decit worsens on average by 9 percent
of GDP following a banking crisis.
25as the ex post real rate on three-month treasury bills.31. Contrary to some theories of the
nancial boom-crash cycle, we nd little statistically signicant evidence that crises before
the 2008 one were preceded by periods of historically low real interest rates, except perhaps
a few years prior to EME banking crises.32 In the recent period, however, interest rates have
been historically and persistently low for both EMEs and advanced economies, between 2.4
and 5.2 percent below baseline for EMEs and 1.2 and 2.5 percent for advanced economies.
While prior episodes of low real interest rates may have fueled consumption and borrowing
bonanzas in EMEs, laying the groundwork for a subsequent crisis, this does not seem to
have been the case this time around. Perhaps the recent period of low interest rates helped
various EME agents, public and private, to strengthen their balance sheets. We have already
documented the behavior of government debt.
We now turn to the evolution of two measures of leverage, internal and external. Our
measure of internal leverage is the ratio of domestic credit to output. Based on data avail-
ability, our preferred measure of domestic credit consists of the total claims of depository
corporations, minus net claims on central government, as collected in the International Mon-
etary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS).33 For economies with simple nancial
systems, the outstanding credit to GDP ratio is likely to be a good proxy for total bank
assets (cf. Table 2). The top panel of gure 4(a) reports our estimates. Two main re-
sults are apparent. First, past banking crises were associated with signicant build-ups in
31As for ination, we estimate a median regression for the real interest rate
32Of course, we are using ex post measures of the real rate of interest. Given the higher and more variable
ex post ination rates (over time and across countries) that prevailed in the past in EMEs, it is inevitably
dicult to produce tight estimates.The contrast with the generally low-ination period leading up to 2008
is striking.
33While excluding claims on the central government, our measure of credit includes claims on state and
local governments. As discussed in detail in appendix B, we also correct the domestic credit data for a few
spurious jumps arising from changes in data coverage.
26credit relative to GDP.34 At its peak, excess credit represents 25 percent of output prior
to advanced country banking crises, and 8.6 percent for EMEs. Second, while the level of
excess credit in the years prior to the recent crisis was of a similar magnitude for advanced
countries, the build-up was more dramatic in the more recent episode (24.8 percent, as com-
pared to 9.3 percent in earlier advanced economies banking crises. While the build-up for
emerging economies also seems signicant (peaking at 6.3 percent of GDP), it is entirely
concentrated in the Central and Eastern European countries while other emerging regions
display no signicant increase in credit to GDP (see panel (b) of gure 7). Emerging Europe
also fared particularly poorly in the crisis, as we have seen. Within that region, increases
in domestic credit are widespread and particularly pronounced in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovenia. We conjecture that the explosion in domestic credit in most of these
countries is intimately tied to the process of their integration into the European Union and
the adoption of the euro.35
Next we turn to our measure of external leverage. By analogy with the balance sheet
of a nancial institution, we propose to dene external leverage as the ratio of a country's
total assets to its gross equity liabilities (domestic and foreign). High leverage indicates that
a country is nancing a large portion of its asset holdings through external debt issuance.36
Figure 4(b) reports our estimates of external leverage, based on the updated Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data on gross external positions (which extend through 2007). While
external leverage appears to have been high prior to earlier emerging market default and
currency crises, it was marginally below the tranquil-times baseline in the most recent crisis.
34That the build-up is larger for advanced economies is not surprising, given these countries' higher level
of nancial development.
35EU membership was an advantage to these countries once the crisis broke, since even those not in the
euro zone beneted from central EU sources of nancial support, as well as support from Sweden, whose
banks were heavily invested in emerging Europe.
36Appendix A provides details on the construction of our measure of external leverage.
27Advanced economies, on the other hand, show an elevated and increasing level of external
leverage before 2008. By 2007, the deviation from tranquil times indicates that through
foreign borrowing, each unit of domestically owned equity was leveraged 32 percentage points
more than in tranquil times.
To summarize our ndings so far: we see several dimensions along which emerging mar-
kets became more resilient, relative to advanced economies, in the years prior to the recent
global crisis. On the macroeconomic side, they achieved price stability and a sounder scal
position. On the nancial side, with the exception of some Central and Eastern European
countries, EMEs did not sharply increase domestic leverage, despite relatively low real inter-
est rates. They also maintained historically low levels of external leverage. In contrast, scal
conditions in advanced economies deteriorated markedly prior to the crisis, reducing the
scal space for the authorities to respond. At the same time, advanced countries' domestic
and external leverage levels increased markedly.
The top panel of gure 5 reports the evolution of the current account surplus relative to
output. We observe a signicant improvement in the current account in the aftermath of
defaults and currency crises, especially for emerging market economies (around 3.5 percent
of output). For EMEs, the sharp current account reversals associated with sudden stops are
evident. Perhaps surprisingly, the largest and most persistent current account decits seem
to appear prior to advanced countries' systemic banking crises (estimated at {4.3 percent).
For the recent crisis, the estimates indicate that emerging markets were running, on average,
larger surpluses relative to tranquil times (around 2.2 percent of GDP). Current account
balances generally decline, on average, as the crisis approaches and then bounce back to
higher surpluses in 2009 as spending falls.37
37Of course, not all countries can be above average since the world's current account sums to zero by
denition. However, since our estimates are unweighted, our results are consistent with a few large countries
28The bottom panel of gure 5 reports the log real exchange rate, with trend estimated and
removed through an HP lter in a procedure identical to that used to estimate output gap.
(In the gures, an increase in the real exchange rate is a real depreciation of the domestic
currency.) Both defaults and currency crises in EMEs are associated with signicant real
depreciations (for currency crises 22 percent), and are preceded by real appreciations relative
to tranquil times (around 8 percent). These currency movements are larger and more abrupt
than those generally observed for advanced countries, although the latter group displays the
same general pattern (including signicant real appreciation prior to crises). In 2008, by
contrast, we notice smaller movements in real exchange rates, for either country group,
although EME exchange rates were generally stronger (compared to tranquil times) ahead
of the crisis, in part a result of buoyant commodity prices.38
Figure 6 shows the behavior of two variables that have been prominent in discussions of
crisis eects on EMEs: foreign exchange reserves and short-term external debt (both relative
to output). For EMEs and advanced countries alike, but most markedly for the former,
reserves (upper panel) are low prior to currency crises and tend to be rebuilt afterward.
They fall prior to default crises but then continue downward, presumably as alternative
external nance sources dry up. The large buildup of EME reserves prior to the 2008 crisis
is evident (10.9 percent above baseline in 2007), as is the fall in EME reserves in 2008 itself
and the subsequent return to rapid accumulation (12.4 percent above baseline by 2009).
World Bank data on short-term foreign debt are available only for EMEs. Levels appear
such as the U.S. running large decits, while many other countries are in balance or surplus. In addition,
a large statistical discrepancy characterizes global current account data for the mid-2000s: The world as a
whole appears to be substantially in surplus.
38The real exchange rates shown are bilateral rates against a \canonical" central currency. See appendix
B for details. The unavailability of multilateral eective rates for most countries dictated this choice. Thus,
for the advanced countries, the 2008 depreciation shown in panel (b) of gure 5 does not include the behavior
of the U.S. dollar (whose real exchange rate against itself is constant).
29elevated before defaults and currency crises, as well as the 2008 crisis, but the marginal
increase in prior debt associated with default crises per se is rather small and insignicant.
It is notable that after banking crises, short-term debts seem to rise. Shortening of maturities
could reect an unwillingness of foreign lenders to extend longer-term credits after a banking
crisis.
In gure 7 we look more closely at an emerging region hit particularly hard by the 2008
crisis, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and we compare it to an average of other EMEs.
CEE had a bigger output boom and a much bigger crash (panel (a)). It had a much bigger
domestic credit boom (panel (b)). Its external leverage was high relative to tranquil times
and rose, whereas it was low and stationary relative to tranquil times in other EMEs (panel
(c)). For emerging Europe, the current account was in decit relative to tranquil times
prior to the crisis, while it was in surplus elsewhere in the emerging world, and there was
a dramatic move from decit to surplus in 2009 (panel (d)). The CEE countries, but not
other EMEs, show a high and rising ratio of short-term foreign debt to GDP prior to 2008
(panel (e)). Finally, CEE real exchange rates (expressed as deviations from trend) appear
quite competitive initially and appreciate between 2003 and 2008, before depreciating after
2008 as a result of nominal depreciation and/or deation (panel(f)). By contrast, for the
remaining EMEs, many of which export primary commodities, detrended real exchange rates
appeared be strong relative to tranquil times and to strengthen further in the years leading
to the crisis. With the exception of the real appreciation indicator, the CEE countries thus
appear markedly more vulnerable than other EMEs on a range of standard fragility measures.
Thus, the greater output cost they bore is consistent with theory.39 Other recent empirical
39Of course, there is heterogeneity among CEE countries, both in preconditions and in policy response,
so one must be cautious in generalizing. The Baltic countries, for example, maintained xed exchange rates
against the euro throughout the crisis. That choice contributed to especially big output declines, as well
as substantial internal deation. It seems likely that xed exchange rates also promoted the prior domestic
30work on the incidence of the crisis, which we describe in section 2.4, generally supports this
conclusion.
2.3 What Determines Crises?
The preceding results emphasize that many crisis episodes were preceded by signicant build-
ups in domestic credit as well as large real appreciations of the currency. Of course, as a
matter of logic, it does not necessarily follow that countries collapse every time credit growth
is high or every time the currency appreciates sharply. Similarly, while we fail to nd any
evidence that crises prior to 2008 were preceded by periods of elevated public debt, it is very
possible that high levels of public debt increase a country's vulnerability. In addition, while
suggestive, our event-study results do not always allow us to assess statistical signicance
with condence. To explore these questions more systematically, we estimate panel discrete-
choice models with country xed eects. Discrete choice models are commonly used in the
\early-warning" literature on crisis prediction.40
As in Bussi ere and Fratzscher (2006), we focus on the occurrence of a crisis in a given
window, not its particular timing. That is, for each type of crisis j and period t, we dene
a forward looking indicator variable yk
jt that takes the value 1 if a crisis (of type j) occurs
between periods t + 1 and t + k, and 0 otherwise. We vary k between 1 and 3 years. Our
benchmark specication assumes a panel logit model with country xed-eects,41 in which















credit booms in the Baltics, contributing in an ex ante sense to the severity of the subsequent collapse.
40See, among others, Eichengreen et al. (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Berg and Pattillo (1999), Bussi ere
and Fratzscher (2006), and Chamon et al. (2012).
41Essentially identical results come from a panel probit specication.
31Following Demirg u c-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), we drop crisis observations as well
as the post-crisis observations for four years afterward, so as to avoid the post-crisis bias
discussed in Bussi ere and Fratzscher (2006).42 We estimate the model over the full sample,
1973 to 2010.43 Table 3 reports the estimates for advanced economies and Table 4 the
estimates for EMEs. We consider the following potential precursors of crises: the ratio of
public debt to output, the ratio of domestic credit to output, the ratio of the current account
balance to output, the real exchange rate, and the output gap, the last two expressed as
percentage deviations from trends as discussed in the previous section. In addition, we
consider the following variables for emerging economies: ocial reserves and short term
external debt, both relative to output. Each table reports the overall probability of crisis
occurrence p(y = 1) evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean;44 for each explanatory variable
xi in the vector x, its standard deviation sd:(xi) over the pre-crisis sample; and the marginal
eect @p=@xi = p(xi)(1   p(xi))i along with White-robust standard errors, evaluated at
the pre-crisis sample mean.45 Finally the column labeled p reports the change in probability
42For example, public debt tends to rise sharply right after crises. From this fact one might erroneously
conclude that relatively low public debt levels make crises more likely.
43To do so, we extend the list of default, banking crisis, and currency crisis events to the years 2003-
2010 as described in appendix C. This adds six external default episodes (Uruguay in 2003, Nigeria in 2004,
Dominican Republic and Venezuela in 2005, Ecuador in 2008 and Jamaica in 2010); 21 banking crises, mostly
in advanced economies (the U.K. and the U.S. in 2007; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in 2008, the Dominican Republic
in 2003, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine in 2008); and nine currency crises (Dominican
Republic, Egypt, and Iraq in 2003, Iceland, Korea, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey in 2008, Belarus in
2009). The set of additional banking crisis episodes includes `borderline' systemic crisis under the Laeven
and Valencia (2010) classication, since some of the recent crisis episodes, such as Spain, Portugal, France
or Greece, may yet have to play out fully.
44To be specic, this is the predicted probability of crisis, evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean of the
explanatory variables. The pre-crisis sample, for a given type of crisis, excludes crisis years as well as the
following four years.
45The standard deviation of each variable is obtained from the residual of a regression on country xed
eects, so as to remove dierences in average levels of each variable across countries. White-robust standard
errors correct for heteroscedasticity in the residuals. If there are omitted serially correlated determinants of
crises, then our standard errors might be underestimates.
32resulting from a one-standard deviation increase in x; evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean,
p = p(xi + sd:(xi)) p(xi); with the corresponding standard error evaluated by the delta
method, also at the pre-crisis sample mean.
We notice rst that the model of banking crises for advanced economies (Table 3, panel
A) performs relatively poorly. While the logit parameters (not reported), and therefore the
eect of the variables on the log odds ratio, are often signicant, the marginal eects remain
economically and statistically negligible, except for domestic credit and public debt, in large
part because of the very low frequency of systemic banking crises in most of the advanced
sample (only ve occurrences between 1973 and 2006).
For advanced economy currency crises, the model performs relatively well. The real
exchange rate emerges consistently as a signicant predictor. A real currency depreciation of
7 percent (one standard deviation) reduces signicantly the unconditional probability of crisis
at the three-year horizon, from 8.8 percent to 3.3 percent.46 At a three-year horizon, three
other variables play a signicant role: domestic credit, the current account, and public debt.
An increase in domestic credit above trend signicantly increases the chances of a currency
crisis within three years. The eect is sizable, with a one-standard deviation change (an
increase of 23 percent of GDP) increasing the predicted probability of crisis in the following
three years, evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean, from 8.8 percent to 11.9 percent. A
larger current account surplus reduces somewhat the likelihood of a currency crisis, although
the eect is modest. A 3.9 percentage point improvement in the current account balance
(as a fraction of output) reduces crisis probabilities only from 8.8 to 7 percent. Perhaps
surprisingly, the estimates indicate that higher levels of public debt predict a decreased
46Of course, given the nonlinear shape of the logit functional form, and the relatively rare occurrence of
crises in sample, the positive eect of a real appreciation on the probability of crisis would be signicantly
larger.
33chance of a currency crisis.
The results from Table 4 for EMEs are consistently strong. Across all types of crisis,
three variables play a statistically and economically signicant role: the ratio of domestic
credit to output, the real exchange rate, and the ratio of ocial reserves to output.47 It is
striking, in particular, to observe that the marginal eect of a higher domestic credit-GDP
ratio is almost always smaller in magnitude and opposite in sign to the coecient on ocial
reserves. For instance, for banking crises at a three-year horizon, the marginal eects are
0.468 percent for credit, and {1.099 for reserves. This nding provides some justication
for prudential policies that seek to accumulate ocial reserves as a buer against nancial
fragility resulting from excessively rapid domestic credit growth, as suggested by Obstfeld
et al. (2010).48
The coecients on credit, the real exchange rate, and reserves are always economically
large. A one standard deviation increase in the credit-GDP ratio (around 9 percent), in-
creases the probability of default over the next three years by 11.5 percent, of banking crisis
by 6.4 percent, and of currency crisis by 9.4 percent. Similarly a one-standard deviation
depreciation of the real exchange rate (around 19 percent) reduces the same probabilities
by 4.3 percent, 4.7 percent, and 2.5 percent respectively. Short term debt clearly matters
for default episodes. A relatively modest 5 percentage point increase in short term debt
(relative to GDP) increases the probability of default by 6.4 percent at a three-year horizon.
Finally, the output gap matters only for banking crises, where a 4 percent increase in output
above potential yields a 7.3 percent increase in the probability of a banking crisis over the
47Frankel and Saravelos (2010), who survey a large number of earlier empirical studies on crisis prediction,
identify reserves and currency overvaluation as the two most consistently important predictors in a body of
work spanning developed as well as developing countries. They also identify a signicant role for domestic
credit.
48Countries may be unable to control their reserve levels just prior to a crisis, because reserves tend to fall
as capital ees, so it is perhaps not surprising that reserves have predictive power.
34following three years. The nding is suggestive of a boom-bust cycle over the sample period
as a whole.
The panel logit estimates yield statistically and economically signicant probability ef-
fects of several key variables. The results are consistent with our event-study analysis and
indicate that several of the macro indicators that appear elevated before crises, notably do-
mestic credit and real currency strength, also contain signicant predictive power for the
occurrence of crises. As a further check on the robustness of our results, we estimated the
model for the period preceding the global nancial crisis, from 1973 to 2002. We then used
those estimates to calculate, out of sample, the one-year-ahead average predicted probabil-
ity of crisis for emerging and advanced countries between 2003 and 2009.49 The predicted
probability of currency crisis increased for emerging economies from 9.3 percent in 2003 to
20.3 percent in 2009 and somewhat more modestly for advanced countries from 5.7 to 13.1
percent.50 By contrast, the probability of a banking crisis for EMEs remained consistently
low: between 1.8 in 2003 and 4.8 percent in 2009, after decreasing from 13 percent in 1995,
a nding that is consistent with the increased resilience of emerging economies documented
in this paper. The out-of-sample probability of banking crisis for advanced economies, on
the other hand, soared from 8 percent in 2003 to 72 percent in 2009!51 The prime drivers
of this increasing nancial fragility of advanced economies relative to emerging ones were
the rapid growth of domestic credit and of public debt in advanced countries, as well as the
rapid accumulation of ocial reserves by emerging countries.
49These results are available upon request.
50The increased probability for EMEs comes from the increase in domestic credit to GDP for these countries
from 3 percent below trend to 4 percent above trend. For advanced countries, while the increase in domestic
credit was larger, the estimates for the pre-2003 period indicate that this variable has a smaller eect on
currency crisis probabilities, as in Table 3.
51The predicted probability of default for EMEs also remained low, around 4 percent between 2003 and
2009.
352.4 Related Empirical Research
A number of econometric studies, conducted as the crisis unfolded and during the course of
recovery, have attempted to link crisis severity in individual countries to various macroeco-
nomic characteristics and preconditions. Some of the studies also attempt to ascertain the
nature of the shocks hitting dierent economies.52 Are the ndings in these papers consistent
with the conclusions of our own comparisons of crisis experience across country groups and
across time?
The preceding studies generally dier from each other in the country groups they study, in
their measurement of declines in economic activity, and in the period over which economic
decline is measured. Moreover, they all face the diculty of accurately controlling for a
variety of relevant dierences across diverse groups of economies. Nonetheless, a few factors
stand out as predictors of crisis intensity in several of the exercises. Among the variables that
appear important in several studies are prior nancial liberalization, prior current account
decits, short-term external debt levels, and prior domestic credit growth.53 These ndings
match theoretical expectation. A liberalized nancial system that is lending heavily is likely
more susceptible to a crash if nancial supervision is week. A country that is borrowing
abroad to support home expenditure is vulnerable to a sudden stop, which will be magnied
if short-term foreign debts simultaneously cannot be renewed.
It seems reasonable that a larger stock of international reserves would have mitigated
52A partial list of contributions includes Chamon et al. (2012), Bergl of et al. (2010), Berkmen et al.
(2009), Blanchard et al. (2010), Claessens et al. (2010), Frankel and Saravelos (2010), Giannone et al.
(2011), International-Monetary-Fund (2010), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011), and Rose and Spiegel (2009),
Rose and Spiegel (2010), Rose and Spiegel (2011).
53These broad generalizations naturally still leave individual country observations such as Germany, which
suered a banking crisis because of nancial contagion, notwithstanding a large current account surplus, no
real estate appreciation, and a competitive real exchange rate. The recent ndings are consistent with earlier
work, for example that of Gupta et al. (2007), who found that post-1970 currency crises were more likely to
be contractionary for nancially open economies that had experienced large capital inows.
36crisis eects, as these can be spent down in the event of a sudden stop. But several
studies, including Rose and Spiegel (2011), detect no role for reserves. On the contrary,
Frankel and Saravelos (2010) argue that reserves aected several measures of crisis inci-
dence, International-Monetary-Fund (2010) argues for a positive but diminishing marginal
productivity of reserves, and Didier et al. (2011) nd a positive role for reserves in aiding the
output growth recovery between 2009 and 2010.54 It may be that many countries (notwith-
standing a few exceptions such as Russia) hoarded reserves during the crisis, as suggested
by the rather moderate average decline shown in the gure above. Policy makers in EMEs
apparently view large reserve stocks as having been useful, if the recent resumption of rapid
EME reserve accumulation is any indication.
Rose and Spiegel (2011), following up on their two earlier papers (Rose and Spiegel (2009);
Rose and Spiegel (2010)), provide a useful compendium and critique of the econometric
literature and ndings. In particular, they provide a set of univariate regressions, for various
country groupings, of dierent measures of output loss on some of the key vulnerability
indicators stressed in the literature. Among the variables entering signicantly in those
regressions are credit market regulation (more regulation lessens crisis intensity); the prior
current account surplus (a bigger surplus lessens crisis intensity); prior short-term foreign
debt (more debt raises crisis intensity); prior real estate appreciation (more appreciation
raises crisis intensity); and prior growth (but not level of) bank credit (higher growth raises
crisis intensity). For example, as we saw above, countries in emerging Europe had current
account decits and credit booms, and these are empirically correlated with larger output
declines in the recent recession. Rose and Spiegel nd no econometric evidence that exchange
rate pegs played a role but anecdotal evidence still suggests that exchange-rate exibility
54Obstfeld et al. (2009) nd an eect of reserves on currency depreciation.
37was an advantage. Thanks in part to maintaining xed exchange rates (as noted above), the
Baltic countries suered especially steep declines in output (see Bergl of et al. (2010)). The
current problems of peripheral euro zone countries might be mitigated if they could devalue
their currencies.
The ndings above are quite consistent with the most of the empirical regularities we
discussed earlier, both regarding the recent global crisis and earlier ones. Rose and Spiegel
(2011) go on to show, however, that the statistical signicance of the preceding factors is
much lower when subsets of them are entered jointly in various regressions measuring crisis
intensity. To us, this does not contradict the idea that crises (especially banking crises
such as prevailed over 2007-08) are generated and intensied by factors (such as nancial
development in an environment of lax supervision and moral hazard) that simultaneously
generate a nexus of collinear responses: bigger external decits and debt, domestic asset-
price ination, and credit booms. Thus, we view the evidence as supportive of the view that
where EMEs' showed resilience in the recent crisis, this was due in part to their avoidance
of excessive foreign and domestic leverage.55
3 Conclusion
The paper has investigated the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables before, during, and
after dierent types of nancial crisis, contrasting the experiences of advanced and emerging
economies in the 2007-2009 global crisis and in earlier post-1973 crises. We nd that the
patterns seen in emerging and advanced economies' crises are qualitatively similar, although
emerging markets have tended to suer greater output losses during currency crises.
55An interesting case study is that of Lim (2012), who documents how Korean corporations reduced
leverage and increased liquidity after the 1997-98 crisis. See Cho (2012) for a more general discussion of
Korean reforms after the late 1990s.
38The two most robust predictors of crises in general, for emerging and advanced economies
alike, are domestic credit growth and real currency appreciation. Thus, nancial vulnerabili-
ties, in the form of excessive leverage, and real vulnerabilities, in the form of low international
competitiveness, both seem to play important roles. Credit booms typically promote real
currency appreciation, and countries that experience both simultaneously are likely to be
especially susceptible to nancial crisis.
Many advanced economies experienced big credit booms prior to the 2007-2009 crisis.
On average, however, credit growth was more moderate in EMEs before the crisis, and those
countries also have tended to recover more rapidly. But average EME behavior disguises het-
erogeneity among dierent countries. Looking across dierent emerging regions, we nd that
Central and Eastern Europe experienced very rapid domestic credit growth (accompanied by
large current account decits and short term foreign borrowing), as well as especially sharp
output collapses. The view that diering susceptibility to credit booms is a central factor
behind the incidence of the 2007-2009 crisis is consistent with the much longer historical
experience analyzed by Schularick and Taylor (2009).
We also nd a third robust determinant of EMEs' crisis probabilities: An emerging coun-
try's level of foreign exchange reserves is a statistically and economically signicant factor
determining the probability of future crises. Our analysis does not reveal the mechanism at
work, and there is surely two-way causality. On the one hand, greater international liquidity
makes an economy less vulnerable to a sudden stop; on the other, if crisis expectations rise for
reasons that may be little related to reserve holdings, reserves are bound to fall sharply. Fu-
ture research should aim to elucidate these channels empirically, as there remains substantial
disagreement among researchers as to the role of reserves in shielding emerging economies
during 2007-2009.
39The Great Depression of the 1930s resulted from an international monetary system fea-
turing nancial instability, severe and seemingly intractable global imbalances, and xed
exchange rates. The crisis of 2007-2009 likewise emerged in a setting of unstable nance
and global imbalances, though only a few countries { mainly on the internal or external
peripheries of the euro zone { have borne the additional burden of xed exchange rates this
time (Eichengreen and Temin (2010)).
As D az-Alejandro (1983) pointed out, countries in Latin America were able partially to
decouple from richer countries during the 1930s by leaving the gold standard and defaulting
on foreign debts. This strategy ushered in a long period of inward looking and ultimately
destructive politics and policies. To the extent that emerging economies escaped the worst
of the global crisis of 2007-2009, they did so in part through economic and institutional
reforms that may have altered the old patterns of the twentieth century. Some of these
reforms resulted in greater economic openness, although relatively low levels of nancial
development and nancial globalization (compared to the advanced economies) may have
been advantages in withstanding the forces that generated the 2007-2009 crisis. It remains
to be seen if emerging economies can preserve their nancial and economic stability without
reducing current levels of economic openness.
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47Appendices
A Measuring External Leverage
Consider the balance sheet of a country i. The asset side includes V i, the value of domestic assets;
Eji (resp. Dji), the value of gross holdings of equity and direct investment in the rest of the world
(resp. of foreign debt, loans and portfolio debt). The liability side includes Eij (resp. Dij), the
gross foreign holdings of domestic equity and direct investment (resp. domestic debt); a residual
item, Wi, that measures the `net worth' of country's residents. Consider this balance sheet as the
balance sheet of a nancial intermediary, that borrows abroad (Dij), raises equity (Eij) and invests
in foreign (Eji and Dji) and domestic (V i) assets. Viewed as a nancial intermediary, the balance
sheet is particularly vulnerable when most of the assets are nanced with senior claims such as
debt. A measure of this vulnerability is our measure of external leverage, dened as the ratio of
total assets (V i + Eji + Dji) relative to equity liabilities (Wi + Eij):
li =
V i + Eji + Dji
Wi + Eij
Gross external assets Ai satisfy: Ai = Eji + Dji. Similarly, gross external liabilities Li satisfy:
Li = Eij + Dijand net foreign assets are simply NAi = Ai   Li. Using these denitions, external
leverage is:
li =
V i + Ai
V i + NAi + Eij; (3)
A simple expression in terms of observables comes from assuming that the market value of
domestic assets is a proportional to output:V i = Y i:56 A reasonable value for  is probably
somewhere between 2 and 4 and we will set  = 3 for our calculations. Under this assumption, the
external leverage ratio can be written as:
li =
 + Ai=Y i
 + NAi=Y i + Eij=Y i: (4)
This expression has a number of intuitive features. First, observe that because NAi + Eij  Ai,
external leverage is always larger than 1. It is exactly equal to 1 when all gross external liabilities
are nanced by equity: NAi = Ai   Eij: Second, the notion of external leverage is dierent from
the gross or net asset position. The reason is simple: A country may have large but osetting gross
positions nanced by equity. Because equity claims do not entail a xed payment stream, and are
junior to debt claims they do not threaten a country with external illiquidity or insolvency. 57
56This assumption is an obvious oversimplication. Yet it is a reasonable approximation if Tobin's average
q is constant, since in that case the market value of domestic assets is proportional to the domestic capital
stock (replacement value), which is quite stable relative to output.
57The leverage ratio is positive as long as  + NAi=Y i + Eij=Y i > 0; that is, as long as the net foreign
position is not too negative. Since Eij=Y i > 0; the right hand side is always larger than : So with  between
2 and 4, this denition would be problematic only when the net foreign asset position is below  200 to  400
48B Data
 Table 1: See appendix C for the list of countries and crisis.
 Table 2: IMF, Global Financial Stability Reports, September 2004{October 2010, Statistical
Appendix, Table 3.
 Figure 1: IMF's October 2010 World Economic Outlook (WEO). Growth rates for 2010 are
IMF forecasts. For each country grouping, the growth rate of GDP is a weighted average of
constant-price GDP growth rates for individual countries, the country weights being shares
of GDP (measured at purchasing power parity) in group GDP (also measured at PPP). We
dene a group's trend real growth rate as the average of annual growth rates over 1980-
2010 (except for the Russian federation and Central and Eastern Europe, where we use the
1994-2010 average).
 Figure 2(a): Output Gap. Real output is constructed from nominal output in local currency
units divided by the GDP deator. Annual data on nominal GDP and GDP deator come
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), the IMF's International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS) and WEO databases and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development's (OECD) National Accounts database. The output gap is constructed
with an Hodrick-Prescott lter, with a smoothing parameter set to 100.
 Figure 2(b): Ination Rate. Rate of change of the Consumer Price Index. Source: WDI, IFS
and OECD. Ination for 2010 constructed from IMF forecasts in the October 2010 WEO.
 Figure 3(a): Gross Public Debt. Gross central government debt as a ratio to GDP from
Reinhart and Rogo (2009). When central government debt is not available, we use Gross
general government debt, also from Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Data are available at
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/ creinhar/Courses.html
 Figure 3(b): Real Interest Rate. Ex post real interest rate dened as the 3-month annualized
domestic treasury bill rate from IFS and the Global Financial Database (GFD), deated by
realized CPI-ination rate over the following year.
 Figure 4(a): Domestic Credit. Domestic credit measured in domestic currency comes from the
IFS. Based on availability, our benchmark data consist of total domestic claims of depository
corporations (central banks and other depository corporations) { IFS line 32 { minus net
claims on central government { IFS line 32an. Exceptions are as follows: Brazil (Claims
on private sector and other nancial corporations of other depository institutions { IFS lines
22d+22g); Argentina, Australia and Ivory Coast (Claims on private sector and other nancial
percent of GDP.
49corporations of depository institutions { IFS lines 32d+32g); Norway (domestic credit data
from Schularick and Taylor (2009)). Domestic credit divided by nominal GDP in domestic
currency. Due to changes in the IFS presentation of monetary statistics as well as changes
in data coverage, we visually identied 11 permanent jumps in the time series (for example,
Sweden in 2001). To correct for these jumps, while allowing for low-frequency trends in
nancial deepening, we rst adjust the credit/GDP variable after each jump by estimating
a linear trend on prior observations and removing the observed residual in the period of the
jump from all subsequent observations. We then construct the residuals from a regression on
a linear time trend.
 Figure 4(b): External Leverage. Constructed according to equation (4). Gross external
assets, gross external liabilities, gross equity and direct investment liabilities in US dollar
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). All data are divided by nominal GDP in US dollars
from WDI.
 Figure 5(a): Current Account. Annual data in US dollars from IFS Balance of Payments
statistics. Divided by output in US dollars from WDI.
 Figure 5(b): Real Exchange Rate. Except as noted below, the real exchange rate denotes
the bilateral US dollar real exchange rate constructed as the nominal end-of-period exchange
rate against the US dollar (from IFS and GFD, expressed in domestic currency units per US
dollar) times the US GDP deator and divided by the domestic GDP deator. For members
of the eurozone, CEE countries, and Ivory Coast, the real exchange rate denotes instead
the bilateral real exchange rate against Germany, using the nominal exchange rate against
the euro after 1999 (against the Deutschemark before that date), and the German GDP
deator. The log-deviation from trend is constructed usingh a Hodrick-Prescott lter, with
the smoothing parameter set to 100.
 Figure 6(a): Foreign Reserves. Total foreign exchange reserves in US dollars from IFS (line
1.d.d), divided by GDP in US dollars from WDI.
 Figure 6(b): Short-Term External Debt. data from the World Bank's Global Development
Finance database. Divided by GDP in US dollars from WDI.
C List of Countries and Crises
C.1 Currency Crises.
See Table 5. To date EME currency crises we use the criterion of Frankel and Rose (1996) { a 25
percent or greater nominal currency depreciation agains the US dollar over a year that is also a 10
percentage point increase in the annual rate of depreciation.
50For advanced economies we use the chronology of Bordo et al. (2001), which extends through
1997. After 1997 there were no true currency crises in advanced countries until 2008, notwith-
standing the ersatz crises some authors have identied using mechanical criteria. We also include
Iceland in 2008.58 The 2003-2010 crisis are marked with a `*' in Table 5.
C.2 Systemic Banking Crises.
See Table 6. We draw our dating of systemic banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2010).
2003-2010 crisis episodes are marked with a `*' in Table 6. This set of additional banking crisis
episodes includes `borderline' systemic crisis under the Laeven and Valencia (2010) classication,
since some of the recent banking crisis may yet have to play out fully.
C.3 Default Crisis.
We draw our dating of domestic and external default episodes from Reinhart and Rogo (2009),
Cantor and Packer (1995), Chambers (2011), Moody's (2009), and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2007). 2003-2010 crisis episodes are marked with a `*' in Table 7.
58A number of advanced countries experienced a signicant depreciation of their currency relative to the
US dollar in 2008. Since this reected mostly the strength of the dollar during that year, we do not classify
these events as currency crisis, except for Iceland.
51Currency Banking Default # Countries
Advanced 43 5 0 22
Emerging 84 57 74 57
Total 127 62 74 79
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 1: Crisis Incidence in Advanced and Emerging Economies, 1970-2006
2003 2007 Change
(percent of GDP)
European Union 210.3 307.9 97.6
United States 71.0 81.1 10.1
Japan 168.4 230.1 61.7
Asia 144.2 151.3 7.1
Emerging Europe 33.6 66.2 32.6
Latin American and Caribbean 51.9 62.1 10.2
Middle East and North Africa 78.7 85.7 7.1
Sub-saharan Africa 71.3 78.5 7.1
World 136.5 174.6 38.1
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, various issues.
Table 2: Commercial Bank Assets as a Percentage of GDP
52Panel A: Banking Crisis 1 year 1-2 years
sd.(x) @p=@x p @p=@x p
Public Debt/GDP 20.59 0.006 0.26 0.028 1.28
(0.007) (0.24) (0.020) (0.69)
Credit/GDP 19.01 0.013 1.38 0.066 7.64
(0.015) (0.96) (0.048) (2.26)
Current Account/GDP 3.75 0.016 0.08 0.080 0.44
(0.022) (0.12) (0.078) (0.47)
Real Exchange Rate 6.78 -0.003 -0.02 -0.029 -0.16
(0.007) (0.04) (0.023) (0.13)
Output Gap 2.26 0.057 0.31 0.211 0.89
(0.078) (0.42) (0.195) (0.86)
p (percent) 0.08 0.41
N:18; NxT: 547
Panel B: Currency Crisis 1 year 1-3 years
sd.(x) @p=@x p @p=@x p
Public Debt/GDP 22.19 -0.025 -0.49 -0.140 -2.66
(0.029) (0.51) (0.078) (1.27)
Credit/GDP 22.75 0.031 0.85 0.119 3.12
(0.021) (0.65) (0.062) (1.81)
Current Account/GDP 3.86 0.100 0.42 -0.508 -1.77
(0.114) (0.53) (0.308) (0.98)
Real Exchange Rate 7.28 -0.414 -1.51 -1.138 -5.48
(0.128) (0.66) (0.211) (0.83)
Output Gap 2.22 -0.542 -0.89 -0.277 -0.60
(0.288) (0.47) (0.657) (1.37)
p (percent) 1.88 8.80
N: 15; NxT: 373
Note: *(**): signicant at 10%(5%). The table reports estimates of a panel logit with country xed-eects
for the occurrence of crisis at horizon t + 1 : t + k where k varies between 1 and 3. All variables in percent.
Real Exchange Rate: deviation from HP-trend. Credit/GDP: deviation from linear trend. Output gap:
deviation from HP-trend. p: estimated probability of crisis, evaluated at the pre-crisis sample mean.
sd.(x): standard deviation of variable over tranquil periods. @p=@x: marginal eect (in percentage) for
variable x, evaluated at tranquil sample mean. p = p(x + sd:(x))   p(x) evaluated at tranquil sample
mean. Robust (White) standard errors evaluated by delta-method when necessary. N: number of crisis
events; NxT: number of observations.
Table 3: Panel Logit Estimation: Advanced Economies. Sample: 1973-2010.
53Panel A: Default 1 year 1-3 years
sd.(x) @p=@x p @p=@x p
Public Debt/GDP 18.78 -0.021 -0.37 -0.193 -3.11
(0.050) (0.86) (0.105) (1.49)
Credit/GDP 7.64 0.417 4.89 1.138 11.49
(0.129) (1.70) (0.197) (2.44)
Current Account/GDP 4.03 0.236 1.08 0.150 0.63
(0.249) (1.27) (0.548) (2.36)
Reserves/GDP 4.58 -0.593 -1.93 -1.309 -5.15
(0.299) (0.69) (0.516) (1.56)
Real Exchange Rate 20.60 -0.052 -0.94 -0.257 -4.26
(0.032) (0.51) (0.089) (1.24)
Short Term Debt/GDP 5.42 0.255 1.66 1.010 6.43
(0.125) (0.94) (0.270) (1.99)
Output Gap 3.79 -0.248 -0.83 0.195 0.75
(0.205) (0.61) (0.489) (1.93)
p (percent) 3.68 11.82
N: 17; NxT: 360
Panel B: Banking Crisis 1 year 1-3 years
sd.(x) @p=@x p @p=@x p
Public Debt/GDP 22.27 0.017 0.41 0.152 4.01
(0.023) (0.58) (0.055) (1.68)
Credit/GDP 10.59 0.181 2.70 0.468 6.35
(0.060) (1.13) (0.127) (2.11)
Current Account/GDP 5.02 0.090 0.49 0.188 0.99
(0.165) (0.97) (0.285) (1.57)
Reserves/GDP 6.91 -0.323 -1.55 -1.099 -5.22
(0.176) (0.61) (0.295) (1.02)
Real Exchange Rate 19.99 -0.075 -1.17 -0.326 -4.71
(0.028) (0.36) (0.073) (0.84)
Short Term Debt/GDP 5.19 0.083 0.47 0.334 1.89
(0.108) (0.65) (0.202) (1.24)
Output Gap 3.93 0.334 1.66 1.414 7.34
(0.206) (1.21) (0.415) (2.61)
p (percent) 2.81 8.94
N:26; NxT: 571
Panel C: Currency Crisis 1 year 1-3 years
sd.(x) @p=@x p @p=@x p
Public Debt/GDP 17.17 0.050 0.96 0.097 1.85
(0.037) (0.80) (0.062) (1.32)
Credit/GDP 9.58 0.329 4.99 0.656 9.36
(0.101) (2.29) (0.149) (3.07)
Current Account/GDP 4.71 0.127 0.65 0.224 1.13
(0.158) (0.88) (0.359) (1.93)
Reserves/GDP 6.89 -0.667 -2.56 -1.372 -5.36
(0.172) (0.68) (0.252) (0.94)
Real Exchange Rate 18.15 -0.023 -0.40 -0.170 -2.53
(0.033) (0.53) (0.069) (0.89)
Short Term Debt/GDP 4.38 0.136 0.65 0.450 2.23
(0.163) (0.84) (0.300) (1.66)
Output Gap 3.78 0.387 1.80 0.451 1.90
(0.202) (1.07) (0.288) (1.33)
p (percent) 3.44 7.21
N:26; NxT: 381
Note: *(**): signicant at 10%(5%). See table 3 for denitions.
Table 4: Panel Logit Estimation: Emerging Market Economies. Sample: 1973-2010.
54Table 5: Currency Crisis Episodes, 1973-2010.
Country Year Source Remarks
Advanced Economies
Australia 1976, 1983, 1985 Bordo et al. (2001)
Belgium 1982 Bordo et al. (2001)
Canada 1981, 1986 Bordo et al. (2001)
Denmark 1976, 1992, 1993 Bordo et al. (2001)
Finland 1986, 1991, 1993 Bordo et al. (2001)
France 1992 Bordo et al. (2001)
Greece 1983, 1985 Bordo et al. (2001)
Iceland 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 2008 Bordo et al. (2001) 2008: authors calculation.
Ireland 1976, 1986, 1992 Bordo et al. (2001)
Italy 1976, 1992, 1995 Bordo et al. (2001)
Japan 1979 Bordo et al. (2001)
New Zealand 1975, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988 Bordo et al. (2001)
Norway 1986 Bordo et al. (2001)
Portugal 1976, 1978, 1983 Bordo et al. (2001)
Spain 1976, 1982, 1992, 1995 Bordo et al. (2001)
Sweden 1992 Bordo et al. (2001)
Switzerland 1977 Bordo et al. (2001)
United Kingdom 1976, 1992 Bordo et al. (2001)
Total 44, of which 43 in 1973-2006
Emerging Economies
Argentina 1975, 1981, 1987, 2002 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Belarus 1996, 2000, 2009 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Brazil 1976, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1999, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Bulgaria 1990, 1996 Frankel and Rose (1996)
C^ ote d'Ivoire 1994 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Chile 1975, 1982 Frankel and Rose (1996)
China 1984, 1994 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Columbia 1985, 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Dominican Republic 1985, 1990, 2003 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Ecuador 1982, 1995 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Egypt 1979, 1989, 2003 Frankel and Rose (1996)
El Salvador 1986, 1990 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Georgia 1998 Frankel and Rose (1996)
India 1991 Frankel and Rose (1996)
continued on next page
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Country Year Source Remarks
Indonesia 1978, 1983, 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Iraq 2003 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Israel 1977, 1983 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Jamaica 1978, 1983, 1991 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Jordan 1988 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Kazakhstan 1999 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Korea 1980, 1997, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Lebanon 1983, 1990 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Macedonia 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Malaysia 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Mexico 1976, 1982, 1994 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Nigeria 1986, 1992, 1999 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Pakistan 1982, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Peru 1976, 1982, 1987 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Philippines 1983, 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Poland 1978, 1986, 1992 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Romania 1990, 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Russia 1998 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Serbia 2000 Frankel and Rose (1996)
South Africa 1984, 2001, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Sri Lanka 1977 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Thailand 1997 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Turkey 1978, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Ukraine 1998, 2008 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Uruguay 1982, 1989, 2002 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Venezuela 1984, 1994, 2002 Frankel and Rose (1996)
Total 91, of which 84 in 1973-2006
* indicates crisis used only in the panel logit analysis of section 2.3 of the paper
56Table 6: Systemic Banking Crisis Episodes, 1973-2010.
Country Year Source Remarks
Advanced Economies
Austria 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Belgium 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Denmark 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Finland 1991 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
France 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) borderline
Germany 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Greece 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) borderline
Iceland 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Ireland 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Japan 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Netherlands 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Norway 1991 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Portugal 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) borderline
Spain 1977, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) 2008 borderline
Sweden 1991, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) 2008 borderline
Switzerland 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) borderline
United Kingdom 2007 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
United States 2007 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Total 20 of which 5 in 1973-2006
Emerging Economies
Argentina 1980, 1989, 1995, 2001 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Bosnia 1992 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Brazil 1990, 1994 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Bulgaria 1996 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
C^ ote d'Ivoire 1988 Caprio et al. (2003)
Chile 1976, 1981 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
China 1998 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Columbia 1982, 1998 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Croatia 1998 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Dominican Republic 2003 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Ecuador 1982, 1996, 1998 Laeven and Valencia (2010) 1986 in Caprio et al. (2003)
Egypt 1980 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
El Salvador 1989 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Estonia 1992 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
continued on next page
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Country Year Source Remarks
Georgia 1991 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Hungary 1991 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Indonesia 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Israel 1977 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Jamaica 1996 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Kazakhstan 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) borderline
Korea 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Kuwait 1982 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Latvia 1995, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Lebanon 1990 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Lithuania 1995 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Macedonia 1993 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Malaysia 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Mexico 1981, 1994 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Morocco 1980 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Nigeria 1991 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Panama 1988 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Peru 1983 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Philippines 1983, 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Poland 1992 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Romania 1990 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Russia 1998, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) 2008 borderline
Slovak Republic 1998 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Slovenia 1992, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010) 2008 borderline
Sri Lanka 1989 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Thailand 1983, 1997 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Turkey 1982, 2000 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Ukraine 1998, 2008 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Uruguay 1981, 2002 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Venezuela 1994 Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Total 62, of which 57 in 1973-2006
* indicates crisis used only in the panel logit analysis of section 2.3 of the paper
58Table 7: Default Episodes, 1973-2010.
Country Year Source Remarks
Emerging Economies
Argentina 1982 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
1989 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
2001 Reinhart (2011) External
Brazil 1983 Reinhart (2011) External
1986 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
1990 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
2002 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
Bulgaria 1990 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) External
C^ ote d'Ivoire 1983 Reinhart (2011) External
2000 Reinhart (2011) External
Chile 1974 Reinhart (2011) External
1983 Reinhart (2011) External
Croatia 1993 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.115) Domestic
Dominican Republic 1975 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
1982 Reinhart (2011) External
2005 Reinhart (2011) External
Ecuador 1982 Reinhart (2011) External
1999 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
2008 Reinhart (2011) External
Egypt 1984 Reinhart (2011) External
El Salvador 1981 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
India 1973 Reinhart (2011) External.
Default started in 1972.
Indonesia 1997 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
1998 Reinhart (2011) External
2002 Reinhart (2011) External
Iraq 1990 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) External
Jamaica 1978 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) External
2010 Chambers (2011) External
Jordan 1989 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) External
Kuwait 1990 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.115) Domestic
Mexico 1982 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
Morocco 1983 Reinhart (2011) External
1986 Reinhart (2011) External
Nigeria 1982 Reinhart (2011) External
continued on next page
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Country Year Source Remarks
2001 Reinhart (2011) External
2004 Reinhart (2011) External
Pakistan 1981 (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007, Table 1) External
1999 Chambers (2011) External
Panama 1983 Reinhart (2011) External
1987 Cantor and Packer (1995) External
1988 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
Peru 1976 Reinhart (2011) External
1978 Reinhart (2011) External
1980 Reinhart (2011) External
1984 Reinhart (2011) External
1985 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
Philippines 1983 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.115) External
Poland 1981 Reinhart (2011) External
Romania 1981 Reinhart (2011) External
1986 Reinhart (2011) External
Russia 1991 Reinhart (2011) External
1993 Cantor and Packer (1995) Domestic
1998 Reinhart (2011), Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) Domestic and external
Serbia 1983 Cantor and Packer (1995) External (Yugoslavia)
1992 Cantor and Packer (1995) External (Yugoslavia)
South Africa 1985 Reinhart (2011) External
1989 Reinhart (2011) External
1993 Reinhart (2011) External
Sri Lanka 1979 Reinhart (2011) External
1981 Reinhart (2011) External
1996 Reinhart (2011) Domestic
Tunisia 1979 Reinhart (2011) External
Turkey 1978 Reinhart (2011) External
1982 Reinhart (2011) External
2001 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
Ukraine 1998 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.115), Moody's (2009) Domestic and external
2000 Moody's (2009) External
Uruguay 1983 Reinhart (2011) External
1987 Reinhart (2011) External
1990 Reinhart (2011) External
2003 Reinhart (2011) External
Venezuela 1982 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.23) External
continued on next page
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Country Year Source Remarks
1990 Reinhart (2011) External
1990 Reinhart (2011) Domestic and external
1995 Reinhart (2011) External
1998 Reinhart and Rogo (2009, p.115) Domestic
2005 Chambers (2011) External
Total 76, of which 74 in 1973-2006
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Advanced ASIA













1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Advanced LATAM













1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Advanced MENA













1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Advanced SSA














1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Advanced CIS CEE
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 2010. Author's Calculations. Each panel reports the growth
rate of output of the corresponding regions in deviation from the region's average growth rate.
Figure 1: Detrended Real Output Growth, by regions (percent p.a.)






















































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type


























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation 1 on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for emerging market economies; in the bottom row
for advanced economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional mean. For inﬂation,
a median regression is estimated.
Figure 2: Empirical Regularities during Past and Present Crisis (1): Output Gap and Inﬂa-






























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type
































































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation (1) on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for emerging market economies; in the bottom row
for advanced economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional mean. For the real
interest rate, a median regression is estimated.
Figure 3: Empirical Regularities during Past and Present Crisis (2): Public Debt and Real


























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T



























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation (1) on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for emerging market economies; in the bottom row
for advanced economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional mean.
Figure 4: Empirical Regularities during Past and Present Crisis (3): Internal and External
Leverage
























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type


























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation (1) on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for emerging market economies; in the bottom row
for advanced economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional mean.
Figure 5: Empirical Regularities during Past and Present Crisis (4): Current Account and
Real Exchange Rate


























































EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
ADV, Default ADV, Banking ADV, Currency ADV, 2008
Crisis year + T
Graphs by Region and Crisis Type






0 EM, Default EM, Banking EM, Currency EM, 2008
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation (1) on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for emerging market economies; in the bottom row
for advanced economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional mean. Short-term
external debt only available for EMEs.
Figure 6: Empirical Regularities during Past and Present Crisis (5): Foreign Reserves and

































































































































































Crisis year + T






























Crisis year + T
Source: Author’s Calculations. Estimation of equation (1) on annual data, between 1973 and 2010. The
estimates of conditional means of each variable, relative to ‘tranquil times’ are reported on the vertical axis.
The horizontal axes represents the number of years before (negative sign) and after a crisis of a given type
(in the diﬀerent columns). Estimates in the top row are for central and eastern european economies; in the
bottom row for other emerging economies. The dots denote a 95% conﬁdence interval for each conditional
mean. Output gap and Real exchange rate in percentage deviation from trend. Domestic credit, current
account surplus, short-term external debt in percent of output. See appendix A for a description of external
leverage.
Figure 7: Empirical Regularities during the 2008 Crisis: CEE vs other Emerging Market
Economies
68